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Introduction
Global health law is essential in responding to the infectious disease threats of a globalizing
world, where no single country, or border, can wall off disease. Yet, the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic has tested the essential legal foundations of the global health system.
Within weeks, the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus has circumnavigated the globe, bringing the world
to a halt and exposing the fragility of the international legal order. Reflecting on how global
health law will emerge in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, it will be crucial to examine
the lessons learned in the COVID-19 response and the reforms required to rebuild global health
institutions while maintaining core values of human rights, rule of law, and global solidarity in
the face of unprecedented threats.
Unlike anything seen since the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918, health systems have faltered
under the strain of the COVID-19 pandemic, with cascading disruptions throughout the world.
Borders have closed, businesses shuttered, and daily life brought to a standstill. In the absence of
a treatment or vaccine, governments worldwide have pressed for physical distancing across their
populations; yet, vulnerable, marginalized, and disadvantaged populations have faced structural
obstacles in meeting these necessary imperatives to contain the disease. This unequal risk of
infection is exacerbating health inequities—within and across nations—with weak health
systems in the Global South lacking the capacity to implement mitigation strategies, test at-risk
populations, or treat infected individuals. As the coronavirus sweeps across unprepared nations,
national legal responses have proven unable to prevent, detect, or respond to the pandemic, and
the sheer scale of human, social, and economic upheaval has challenged global health law as
never before.
Framing global health law to address infectious disease, the International Health Regulations
(IHR) have established a global surveillance and reporting system for infectious disease control
and set national minimum mandatory controls to prevent disease and maximum permissible
limitations on individual rights, state sovereignty, and commercial interests. Last revised in 2005
following the shortcomings in national and global responses to the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) epidemic, the revised IHR provide a legal framework through the World
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Health Organization (WHO) to build national capacity for infectious disease prevention and
detection and to strengthen global governance to address any public health emergency of
international concern. While the IHR were intended to facilitate international coordination in the
context of public health emergencies, nationalist responses have challenged global governance in
addressing this pandemic challenge. Amidst these challenging circumstances, WHO has faced
increasing IHR violations from states and, as a consequence, limited influence in the COVID-19
response.
Global health law remains crucial to preventing, detecting, and responding to COVID-19—
implementing the IHR to control the rapid spread of this novel coronavirus—and this column
explores the promise and limitations of this WHO framework. Outlining the international legal
landscape, this column examines the evolution of global governance over infectious disease,
describing how limitations of global health governance led to the contemporary revision of the
IHR. This column then analyzes the implementation of the revised IHR in the COVID-19
response, reflecting both the promise of the IHR in promoting global solidarity and the
weaknesses of the IHR in realizing an international response to this global threat. Given the
continuing limitations of the IHR, this column considers reformed international legal authorities
and new international legal instruments necessary to bind states together under global health law
in facing future pandemic threats.
The Legal Landscape
Drawing from the long history of international health law described in the opening column on
“Global Health Law,”1 the 1946 WHO Constitution provided WHO with the authority to
negotiate conventions, regulations, and recommendations on any public health matter. With this
broad constitutional authority to regulate public health, WHO assumed governance over the IHR
as an international legal framework to control infectious disease. The IHR aim to structure a
harmonized surveillance, reporting, and response system across WHO member states – with
these regulations automatically binding on all WHO member states unless explicitly rejected.
Yet, the applicability of the IHR was limited to only three select diseases (cholera, plague, and
yellow fever), and as the world faced a continuous stream of emerging and re-emerging diseases,
the principal international legal instrument for preventing, detecting, and responding to
infectious disease outbreaks was increasingly seen as inadequate.
Despite calls for the revision of the IHR, it took an outbreak of a novel coronavirus to prompt
international action. SARS emerged in Guangdong, China in late 2002, but China did not inform
WHO of this emerging threat – as SARS was not one of the three diseases covered by the IHR.
China’s delay in accurately reporting the SARS outbreak—compounded by the use of domestic
legal restrictions inconsistent with public health practice—drew widespread international
condemnation, raising calls for WHO action.2 With SARS highlighting the weaknesses of
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international law for infectious disease control, the international community committed with
remarkable speed to updating the breadth, scope, and notification obligations under the IHR.
The 2005 revision of the IHR provides the contemporary legal framework to prevent, detect, and
respond to public health emergencies of international concern. The IHR (2005) were designed to
achieve a higher level of global health security while avoiding unnecessary interference to
international traffic and safeguarding human rights in the public health response.3
Looking beyond specific infectious diseases, IHR (2005) codified the versatile and
encompassing category of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), which
includes any extraordinary event that:
1) constitutes a public health risk to other states through the international spread of
disease (broadly defined as “any illness or medical condition, irrespective of
origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans”) and
2) potentially requires a coordinated international response.4
Through National IHR Focal Points, states bear an obligation to notify WHO within 24 hours of
all detected events within their territory which may constitute a PHEIC.5 Based upon information
received from both state and non-state sources (e.g., media and online sources, civil society, and
other states), the WHO Director-General has the ultimate authority to determine whether an
event constitutes a PHEIC, considering:
1) information provided by the State Party within whose territory an event is
occurring;
2) advice from an ad hoc technical expert group known as the Emergency
Committee;
3) scientific principles, available scientific evidence, and other related information;
and
4) an assessment of the risk to human health, of the risk of international spread, and
of the risk of interference with international traffic.6
This PHEIC declaration has since been employed by WHO six times to control the international
spread of infectious disease: polio, Zika, Influenza H1N1, Ebola (in West Africa and then in the
Congo), and most recently in the ongoing global struggle against COVID-19.
Beyond the international declaration of a PHEIC, the IHR bind states to build their domestic
capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to the international spread of disease. Using the
normative power of global health law to frame national efforts to contain disease, the IHR set
concrete obligations for governments to strengthen national public health capacities and improve
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global health security. States retain sovereignty to develop health legislation, but this domestic
legislation “should uphold the purpose” of the IHR, reinforcing international commitments.7
These international health commitments extend to human rights law, with the IHR requiring that
domestic implementation “shall be with the full respect for the dignity, human rights and
fundamental freedoms of persons.”8 Thus, national measures under the IHR must be based on
scientific risk assessment and must not be more restrictive of international traffic, or more
intrusive to individuals, than reasonably available alternatives.9 Where nations lack the capacity
to meet these commitments, the IHR provide a path for international collaboration and assistance
in the development, strengthening, and maintenance of national public health capacities.10
As an international legal framework for global health security, WHO plays a coordinating role in
the global surveillance and reporting system created by the IHR, supporting member states in
strengthening health systems and building public health capacities. However, states were slow to
reform their public health capacities following IHR (2005), pushing WHO to work with states in
2016 to develop monitoring mechanisms to facilitate accountability for public health law
reforms. The resulting Joint External Evaluation (JEE) has provided a monitoring and evaluation
tool to assess IHR implementation at the country-level, creating an independent expert review
process to: assess national progress in meeting IHR core capacities, find gaps in implementation,
and identify best practices.11 This voluntary, collaborative, multisectoral process seeks to help
countries strengthen their capacities to prevent, detect, and rapidly respond to public health
threats. Yet despite these evolving efforts to support states in building public health capacities
and meeting IHR responsibilities, many states continue to shoulder weak health systems with
inadequate legal capacity.12
Implementing the IHR in the COVID-19 Response
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought into sharp focus the limitations of the IHR in (1) reporting
public health risks to WHO; (2) declaring a PHEIC where necessary in the international
response; (3) coordinating national responses commensurate with public health risks; and (4)
supporting national capacities for infectious disease prevention, detection, and response.
From the initial outbreak in China, reporting delays significantly hampered WHO’s ability to
understand the scope of the threat and coordinate the international response. Although China first
reported a case of novel coronavirus to WHO on December 31, 2019, retrospective analyses have
demonstrated that SARS-CoV-19 was already circulating in Wuhan for several weeks prior to
the first WHO notification.13 One of the principal IHR reforms in 2005 was to allow WHO to
take account of non-state (“unofficial”) sources of information, recognizing that governments are
often reluctant to notify WHO of novel pathogens within their borders; however, this innovation
was ineffective in the early days of the COVID-19 outbreak, as Chinese authorities repressed
health workers, scientists, and civil society in early December 2019 – keeping them from sharing
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concerns about a novel coronavirus in Wuhan.14 (As the IHR does not provide WHO authority to
investigate events independently, the IHR requirement for WHO to verify reports received from
non-state sources with the relevant state dismantled an additional channel through which WHO
could have received the necessary information.15) Legitimate questions remain as to what
Chinese authorities knew, when they learned it, and whether they notified WHO in a “timely,
accurate and sufficiently detailed” manner in accordance with the IHR16 – or whether, as with
SARS, the response was impeded by the information politics of autocratic governance, leaving
WHO with insufficient information to promptly declare a PHEIC.17
Even after China notified WHO about this coronavirus outbreak, the IHR failed to facilitate
WHO’s timely declaration of a PHEIC, delaying global preparations for a pandemic response.
With inadequate reporting and a split in expert opinion, WHO Director-General Tedros
Adhanom Ghebreyesus convened an Emergency Committee on three occasions in late January
2020 to advise on the declaration of a PHEIC, as the Committee continued to find that it was
“too early” and that there were “a limited number of cases abroad.”18 (The definition of a PHEIC
may have been misunderstood at this critical juncture, as neither the “timing” nor the actual
international spread of disease are constitutive elements of a PHEIC – as on the latter question,
there need only be the “potential” for international spread.19) A PHEIC was finally declared on
January 30th, by which point the coronavirus was well on its way to becoming a pandemic –
something WHO would not formally acknowledge until March 11th.20 Global health law scholars
have often questioned WHO’s tentative approach to declaring a PHEIC, arguing that where the
IHR definition is met, a PHEIC declaration can spur action, investment, and solidarity from the
international community.21 Yet, WHO has long remained diplomatically hesitant to exercise its
authority to declare a PHEIC, apprehensive of a declaration that could devastate the economies
of affected states and spur nationalist attacks on WHO leadership.22
Following the PHEIC declaration, states have responded with overwhelming restrictions on
international traffic, individual rights, and global commerce – with these nationalist restrictions
taken in direct contravention of WHO recommendations. In responding to PHEICs under the
IHR, state responses are expected to adhere to WHO’s temporary recommendations and other
IHR parameters.23 Where states apply other health measures, such measures are required under
the IHR to achieve equal or greater health protection than the WHO recommendations and be:
1) based on scientific principles, and available scientific evidence, or where such evidence is
insufficient, on advice from the WHO and other relevant intergovernmental
organizations;
2) not more invasive to persons nor more restrictive of international traffic than reasonably
available alternatives; and
3) implemented with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedom of
persons.24
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Although states have previously disregarded WHO recommendations by erecting travel and trade
restrictions, the sheer scale of violative state action has been breathtaking—including travel bans,
flight suspensions, visa restrictions, and border closures—shutting down interactions within and
between countries.25 Governments rapidly instituted domestic Stay-at-Home orders, closed
businesses, banned public gatherings, and even erected cordon sanitaires (guarded areas where
individuals may not enter of leave).26 (WHO praised China’s early containment efforts as
“ambitious, agile and aggressive,”27 yet it has since tempered its enthusiasm for such restrictions
on individual liberties.28) Even as evidence increasingly points to the need for widespread
testing, contact tracing, and physical distancing,29 with transparent governance and public
participation in health decision-making, governments are increasingly using such states of
emergency as pretext for widespread abuses of human rights and subversive attacks on
democratic governance.30
Finally, the rise of nationalism has undercut the global solidarity envisaged under the IHR, which
requires states to adopt a common and shared responsibility to “collaborate...to the extent
possible.”31 While these IHR duties of international “collaboration and assistance” are
intentionally unspecific, states have taken advantage of these ambiguities to limit their actions to
national frontiers while shirking international responsibilities. The international community’s
failure to ensure the equitable global distribution of “staff, stuff, space and systems” has already
twice created the perfect storm for the resurgence of Ebola.32 Instead of now coming together to
confront the COVID-19 pandemic through global governance, states have reverted to isolationist
policies, geopolitical competition, discriminatory attacks, and global neglect. This
shortsightedness amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, neglecting WHO guidance and threatening
WHO support when global governance is needed most, has exposed the world to staggering
humanitarian upheaval, economic instability, and health insecurity.33
The world is now paying in immeasurable human suffering for these compounding IHR
violations, with COVID-19 presenting a lasting threat to health security, human rights, and the
rule of law.34 Where states fail to uphold the rule of law, the world loses the ability to mitigate
common threats through collective action. The future of global health must have international
law at its foundation. When the pandemic recedes, WHO must mobilize its member states to
undertake a major review of international legal authorities, including WHO’s institutional
structure, to realize the promise of global health law in addressing future infectious disease
threats.

Revising Global Health Law to Address Future Infectious Disease Threats
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Global health law has proven unable to mitigate the threat of COVID-19, raising an imperative
for international legal reforms to clarify state obligations, facilitate legal accountability, and
realize global health security. Such holistic reforms of global health law will require either the
undertaking of fundamental revisions to the IHR framework or the development of a new
international legal instrument to structure global health governance.
Moving forward, it will be necessary to ensure that WHO is amply funded and politically
supported, empowering it to speak “truth to power” in confronting governments that do not
comply with science-based recommendations. This will require critical reforms of global health
law, including revisions to provide authority for:
● Enhanced Surveillance and Mandatory Reporting – allowing for unofficial data sources,
including civil society and academic experts, and the independent collection of public
health data where necessary by WHO staff;35
● Transparency in PHEIC Deliberations – allowing for open and independent EC decisionmaking36 and shifting from a binary trigger to a tiered system of multiple levels of public
health emergency to spur appropriate state responses;37
● Rapid & Public Monitoring of State Measures – allowing scrutiny of state decisions that
do not comply with WHO guidance, with monitoring and review in global economic
governance, under international trade law, and through the human rights system; and
● Global Funding Mechanisms – allowing for the development of new or reformed global
governance institutions to pool international funding and bolster technical support for the
development of sustainable national public health systems to prevent, detect, and respond
to outbreaks.38
Developed through global health law reforms, WHO has authority under its constitution to
negotiate conventions (art. 19), regulations (art. 21), and recommendations (art. 23), and all of
these authorities should be considered in either:
● Revising the IHR architecture to reflect the imperative for reforms – with built-in and
ongoing processes to amend the IHR in accordance with the changing nature of future
public health emergencies and evolving scientific knowledge;
● Developing a Framework Convention on Infectious Disease – with binding obligations
and accountability mechanisms under a newly-negotiated legal instrument, supported by
compliance mechanisms, periodic meetings of states parties, and dispute settlement
processes;39 or
● Providing standing WHO recommendations on appropriate state responses – with
detailed WHO guidance on appropriate national policies and regular empirical analysis of
the impact of public health laws on public health outcomes.
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States will be the ultimate decisionmakers in these next steps, yet these reforms must recognize
the ongoing struggle that states have faced in preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious
disease. Where the COVID-19 pandemic has presented an unprecedented threat to global health,
impacting every country throughout the world, it will be urgently necessary in its aftermath to
reshape the global health law landscape to respond collectively to the common threat of future
pandemics.
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